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Abstract—In the last decade, mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) have emerged as a major next generation wireless
networking technology. However, MANETs are vulnerable to
various attacks at all layers, including in particular the network
layer, because the design of most MANET routing protocols
assumes that there is no malicious intruder node in the network.
In this paper, we present a survey of the main types of attack
at the network layer, and we then review intrusion detection
and protection mechanisms that have been proposed in the
literature. We classify these mechanisms as either point detection
algorithms that deal with a single type of attack, or as intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) that can deal with a range of attacks.
A comparison of the proposed protection mechanisms is also
included in this paper. Finally, we identify areas where further
research could focus.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection and prevention, mobile ad
hoc networks, network layer attacks, securing ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of mobile wireless devices working together
was proposed in the 1990s, since when a significant amount
of research has been conducted on mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs). The IETF established the Mobile Ad hoc Net-
works Working Group [1] in 1997, with the aim of stan-
dardizing routing protocols for MANETs. They developed
two standard track routing protocol specifications, namely
the reactive and proactive MANET protocols. Another IETF
working group, called Ad Hoc Networks Autoconfiguration
(autoconf) [2], had as its main aim considering the issues
in the addressing model for ad hoc networks. MANETs use
IEEE 802.11 architecture components as described in [3]. The
Basic Service Set (BSS) defines an architecture in which all
stations can communicate between themselves using IEEE
802.11 wireless LAN technology. A BSS consists of an access
point (AP) and all the stations associated with it. Figure 1
shows the alternative ad hoc network architecture using the
IEEE 802.11 independent basic service set (IBSS). In this
mode no access point is required, and nodes communicate in
a distributed peer-to-peer manner. The minimum requirement
for IBSS operation is that two nodes be within radio range of
each other.
MANETs have wide applications in various fields. For
example, they have been used in a military context since the
1970s to ensure the timely flow of information and command
in battle, contributing to the success of a mission. Given their
desirable characteristic of fast and easy deployment, MANETs
are also ideal for establishing communication networks and
providing rescue services following natural disasters such as
earthquakes or floods. Another major application of MANETs
is on-the-fly collaborative computing outside an office en-
vironment, for example during fieldwork, in a team project
Fig. 1. Ad hoc architecture using IEEE 802.11 IBSS
offsite, or during an offsite meeting. Researchers are also
investigating the technicalities of application scenarios for
MANETs in commercial areas. For example, MANETs can
be used in communication dispatch systems for taxis in a
town to inform individual taxis about passenger pickups, route
directions, weather conditions etc. Finally, they can also be
used in personal networking: for example, PDAs, notepads,
and cell phones can form an ad hoc network to communicate
and achieve other networking capabilities using IEEE 802.11.
Noting these wider applications of MANETs, much research
has been conducted since 1990 on various aspects such as
routing, security, quality of service, IP addressing, multiple ac-
cess, and management of these networks. A significant part of
the research work has focused on providing security services
for MANETs, because security is the main obstacle for the
widespread adoption of MANET applications. MANETs are
vulnerable in their functionality: intruders can compromise the
operation of the network by attacking at any of the physical,
MAC or network layers. The network layer, especially the
routing protocol, is vulnerable because of the use of cooper-
ative routing algorithms, the limited computational ability of
nodes, the exhaustible node batteries, a lack of clearly defined
physical network boundary and the transient nature of services
in the network. Standard information security measures such
as encryption and authentication do not provide complete
protection, and, therefore, intrusion detection and prevention
(IDP) mechanisms are widely used to secure MANETs.
IDP systems have been used for the last three decades as
one of the main layers of security in organizational networks.
Research in this area started with Anderson’s paper [4] in
1980. Since then, a significant number of intrusion detection
system prototypes and proposals have been published, 92 of
which have been recorded by Sobirey [5]. The authors in [6][7]
presented a comprehensive taxonomy of intrusion detection
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IDS proposals. Although the networking technology has since
evolved and the networking paradigm has shifted from fixed
to wireless networks in the last decade, intrusion detection
and prevention is still considered as one of the basic layers
of defence. Indeed, in infrastructure-less wireless networks
such as MANETs where network firewall implementation is
complex, intrusion detection and prevention is now considered
as the first layer of defence [7][8].
Intrusion detection (ID) in MANETs is more complex and
challenging than in fixed networks, because of the difficulty in
fulfilling the requirements of IDS (namely the ability to collect
audit data from the network, and apply ID techniques to detect
intrusion with a low rate of false positives and an effective
response to intrusion) and because some characteristics of
MANETs create operational and implementation complexities.
Additional challenges for IDSs in MANETs are as follows:
• MANETs lack concentration points where monitoring
and audit data collection can be performed
• MANET routing protocols require nodes to cooperate and
act as routers, creating opportunities for attacks
• Due to the nodes’ mobility, the network topology is dy-
namic and unpredictable, making the process of intrusion
detection complicated
• IDSs in MANETs are more complex because of the
limited computational ability of most of the nodes
To cover the wide range of intrusion detection and prevention
techniques in MANETs, in this paper we divide the tech-
niques into two categories: those that are designed to deal
with a single type of attack (which we call point detection
algorithms), and those that can identify a range of attacks,
which we consider to be true IDSs. In addition, this paper
only considers network layer attacks. Consequently, given the
importance of security services in MANETs and the challenges
of protecting them from different types of attacks, in this paper
we present a survey of network layer attacks, a critical review
of their protection mechanisms and their classification as point
detection algorithms or intrusion detection systems.
A number of surveys of intrusion detection for MANETs
have been published. For example, [9] discussed the challenges
of IDSs and presented a survey of a number of IDS proposals
in both MANETs and WSNs. In [10], a description of network
layer attacks and a survey of defence mechanisms for specific
attacks were given. The authors of [11] presented a survey
of anomaly-based intrusion detections systems (ABID) for
MANETs. They compared eight ABID systems, considering
detection techniques, attack types addressed and simulation
environment, and discussed the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed mechanisms. In [12] the authors presented a
survey of MANET IDSs that deal with specific attacks, and
analyzed some of the challenges of IDSs. The authors of [13]
surveyed countermeasures proposed for various network layer
attacks, structuring their survey by attack type. In [14] the
authors presented a survey of IDSs in MANETs and wireless
mesh networks, mostly from the preceding four years. They
compared IDSs based on the type of attack addressed and their
underlying architecture. They also suggested that IDS needs
a scalable architecture based on cross-layer design to detect
these attacks effectively. [15] surveyed and classified IDSs in
MANETS based on their architecture and the addressed type
of attack. A number of mechanisms for detecting black hole
attacks were reviewed in [16]. Our paper extends all the above
work and draws on the significant amount of research that has
been conducted since these papers were published, to provide
an up to date view of the current state of the art in MANET
intrusion detection. In particular, as we have noted, we classify
the defence mechanisms as either point detection algorithms
that deal with single types of attack, or as IDSs that deal with
a wide variety of attacks.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we present a classification of network layer attacks and
then illustrate some of the main types. Section III reviews
the point detection algorithms that have been proposed to
secure MANETs from specific network layer attacks. Section
IV then considers proposals that detect a range of attack
types; the section first introduces the main categories of
intrusion detection systems, then describes the challenges of
implementing IDSs in MANETs, and finally reviews proposed
IDSs and their architectures. Finally, Section V presents a
summary, considers some open questions and suggests future
research directions.
II. ATTACKS IN MANETS
Various types of network layer attacks or intrusions are
known for MANETs. In this Section we first present a clas-
sification of major network layer attacks and introduce some
individual attacks. We then illustrate some major network layer
attacks.
A. Classification of Network Layer Attacks
Network layer attacks in MANETs can be divided into two
main categories, namely passive attacks and active attacks, as
shown in Figure 2.
1) Passive Attacks : Passive attacks are those where the
attacker does not disturb the operation of the routing protocol
but attempts to seek some valuable information through traffic
analysis. This in turn can lead to the disclosure of critical
information about the network or nodes such as the network
topology, the location of nodes or the identity of important
nodes. Some examples of passive attacks are as follows:
Eavesdropping
Because of the wireless links in MANETs, a message sent
by a node can be heard by every device equipped with a
transceiver and within radio range, and if no encryption is
used then the attacker can get useful information. The sender
and receiver usually have no means of knowing that this
attack has taken place. Although in most cases eavesdropping
is not considered to be a severe attack, it could provide
vital information in some scenarios and therefore researchers
have focused on minimizing it. For example in [92] the
authors analyzed the risk of eavesdropping as a function of
the transmission range of the nodes and their geographical
distribution.
Traffic Analysis and Location Disclosure
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Attackers can listen to the traffic on wireless links to
discover the location of target nodes by analyzing the com-
munication pattern, the amount of data transmitted by nodes
and the characteristics of the transmission. For example, in a
battlefield scenario, a large amount of network traffic normally
flows to and from the headquarters. Traffic pattern analysis
therefore allows an intruder to discover the commanding
nodes in the network. Even if the data in a message is
protected by encryption, traffic analysis can still be performed
to extract some useful information. Although passive attacks
do not directly affect the network’ functionality, in some
MANET application scenarios, such as military communica-
tion, important information disclosure through traffic analysis
or simply eavesdropping could prove costly. Examples of work
on analysis and protection against these attacks can be found
in [92][17][18].
2) Active Attacks : In active attacks, intruders launch in-
trusive activities such as modifying, injecting, forging, fab-
ricating or dropping data or routing packets, resulting in
various disruptions to the network. Some of these attacks
are caused by a single activity of an intruder and others can
be caused by a sequence of activities by colluding intruders.
Active attacks (as compared to passive attacks) disturb the
operations of the network and can be so severe that they
can bring down the entire network or degrade the network
performance significantly, as in the case of denial of service
attacks. Therefore, in this paper we have focused on active
network layer attacks. Active attacks can be further divided
into malicious packet dropping attacks and routing attacks, as
shown in Figure 2.
Malicious Packet Dropping
A path between a source node and a destination node in a
MANET is established using a route discovery process. Once
this has been done, the source node starts sending the data
packet to the next node along the path; this intermediate node
identifies the next hop node towards the destination along
the established path and forwards the data packet to it. This
process continues until the data packet reaches the destination
node. To achieve the desired operation of a MANET, it is
important that intermediate nodes forward data packets for any
and all source nodes. However, a malicious node might decide
to drop these packets instead of forwarding them; this is known
as a data packet dropping attack, or data forwarding misbe-
haviour. In comparison to deliberately malicious behaviour, in
some cases nodes are unable to forward data packets because
they are overloaded or have low battery reserves; alternatively
the nodes may be selfish, for example saving their battery
in order to process their own operations. Packet dropping
attacks differ from black hole and grey hole attacks (see below)
because there is no attempt to “capture” the routes in the
network.
Routing Attacks
Both the reactive and proactive routing protocols are vul-
nerable to routing attacks because they route based on the
assumption that all nodes cooperate to find the best path. Con-
sequently, a malicious node can exploit the vulnerabilities of
the cooperative routing algorithms and the lack of centralized
control to launch routing attacks. In particular, the on-demand
(reactive) MANET routing protocols, such as AODV [19] and
DSR [20], allow intruders to launch a wide variety of attacks.
In the following we give examples of how different intrusive
activities can cause various attacks in MANETs, illustrating
them with AODV as the routing protocol.
Sleep Deprivation Attack
Sleep deprivation (SD) [21] is a distributed denial of service
attack in which an attacker interacts with the node in a
manner that appears to be legitimate, but where the purpose
of the interaction is to keep the victim node out of its power-
conserving sleep mode. In [22] the authors consider an intruder
that can cause SD of a node by exploiting the vulnerability of
the route discovery process of the protocol through malicious
route request (RREQ) flooding in the following ways:
Malicious RREQ Flooding 1: an intruder broadcasts a
RREQ with a destination IP address that is within the network
address range but where the corresponding node does not exist.
This compels all the nodes to forward this RREQ because no
one will have the route for this destination IP address.
Malicious RREQ Flooding 2: After broadcasting a RREQ
an intruder does not wait for the ring traversal time, but it
continues resending the RREQ for the same destination with
higher TTL values. This is a significant denial of service
attack when we consider the energy constrained operations
of MANETs.
Black Hole Attack
Intruders can exploit the vulnerability in route discovery
procedures of on-demand routing protocols, such as AODV
and DSR, when a node requires a route towards the desti-
nation. The node sends a RREQ and an intruder advertises
itself as having the fresh route. By repeating this for route
requests received from other nodes, the intruder may succeed
in becoming part of many routes in the network. The intruder,
once chosen as an intermediate node, drops the packets instead
of forwarding or processing them, causing a black hole (BH)
[23] in the network. The way the intruder initiates the black
hole attack and captures the routes may vary in different
routing protocols. For example, in AODV, the destination
sequence number (dest_seq) is used to represent the freshness
of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher
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as having the fresher route by sending a Route Reply (RREP)
packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the current
dest_seq number. In this way, the intruder becomes part of the
route to that destination. The severity of the attack depends on
the number of routes in the network the intruder successfully
becomes part of.
Grey Hole Attack
A grey hole attack (GH) [24] is a special case of the
BH attack, in which an intruder first captures the routes, i.e.
becomes part of the routes in the network (as with the BH
attack), and then drops packets selectively. For example, the
intruder may drop packets from specific source nodes, or it
may drop packets probabilistically or drop packets in some
other specific pattern. As we noted above, BH and GH attacks
are different in nature from packet dropping attacks, where
the attacker simply fails to forward packets for some reason.
BH and GH attacks on the other hand comprise two tasks: the
attacker first captures routes and then either drops all packets
(BH attack) or some packets (GH attack).
Rushing Attack
In order to limit the control packet overhead, an on-demand
protocol only requires nodes to forward the first RREQ that
arrives for each route discovery. An attacker can exploit this
property by spreading RREQ packets quickly throughout the
network to suppress any later legitimate RREQ packets. For
example, in AODV an intruder can forge and forward a rushed
RREQ, assigning a higher source sequence (src_seq) number
to it; the intruder will also transmit the packet earlier than
specified in the AODV protocol (this is the sense in which it
is a “rushing” attack). This causes any later legitimate RREQ
to be suppressed, and increases the probability that routes that
include the intruder will be discovered instead of other valid
routes. Hu et al. [25] first described the rushing attack, and
proposed its prevention through a set of generic mechanisms
such as secure neighbour detection, secure route delegation
and randomized RREQ forwarding.
Sybil Attack
Each node in a MANET requires a unique address to
participate in routing, through which nodes are identified.
However, in a MANET there is no central authority to verify
these identities. An attacker can exploit this property and send
control packets, for example RREQ or RREP, using different
identities; this is known as a sybil attack (SY) [26]. This is
an impersonation attack where the intruder could use either
random identities or the identity of another node to create
confusion in the routing process, or to establish bases for some
other severe attack.
In summary, we note that the motivation of intruders
behind launching either packet dropping or routing attacks
is to achieve a certain goal such as denial of service (i.e.
making certain resources or services, such as applications,
web access, printing, or routing, unavailable to the intended
users). In addition, other goals of intruders might include
partitioning the network, creating routing loops, discovering
valuable information, or theft of resources.
B. Illustration of Network Layer Attacks
In this subsection we illustrate the operation of some of the
major network layer attacks that were introduced in subsection
A.
1) Sleep Depriviation Attack Illustration: We start with the
sleep deprivation attack defined in section II.A, using AODV
as the routing protocol as an example to illustrate in detail the
ways this attack can be introduced in the network.
When a node needs a route towards a destination, it initiates
a route discovery process by broadcasting a RREQ with its
current destination sequence number. If an intermediate node
that receives the RREQ knows the route, it unicasts a RREP
back to the source node, otherwise it rebroadcasts the RREQ
packet. To control the dissemination of RREQs, AODV uses
an expanding ring search technique, where the source node
first sends a RREQ with its Time to Live (TTL) field set to
some initial value, TTL_start. The source then waits for the
ring_traversal_time. If this time expires without receiving a
RREP the source node may send a RREQ again with increased
TTL value. This process can be repeated until the TTL value
reaches some value TTL_threshold, where TTL_threshold >
TTL_start. Now consider Figure 3, which shows a snapshot
of the network, where circles represent nodes and the dotted
lines show direct links between the nodes. Suppose that node
v6 is an intruder, and suppose it launches a SD attack using
malicious RREQ flooding as follows:
• v6 generates a RREQ with a destination IP address for
some non-existent node v25, (i.e. the IP address is within
the network’s address range but the node does not exist).
Intruder v6 broadcasts this RREQ (we assume here that
the TTL value is sufficiently large to allow the RREQ
to propagate across the network). Figure 4 shows the
network after this initial broadcast. Nodes v2 , v1 , v5 and
v9, which are within the radio range of v6, will receive the
RREQ (the solid arrows show the RREQ flow), and check
their routing table entries for routes to the destination
node v25.
• Because nodes v2, v1, v5 and v9 do not have the route
for node v25, they will rebroadcast the RREQ initiated by
the intruder.
• Nodes that receive RREQs from v2 , v1 , v5 or v9 will
first check whether they have processed earlier copies of
these requests; if not, then they will also broadcast this
malicious RREQ further.
• Since no nodes know the route for this destination node,
this process continues across the network.
Figure 5 shows the state of the network after the RREQ has
been broadcast for three hops. The part of the network shown
in the figure is flooded with malicious RREQs, and eventually
the entire network will be flooded with these RREQs. Nodes
processing these unnecessary packets drain their batteries and,
hence, may no longer be able to provide services in the
network.
In [27], the authors proposed neighbour supervision as a
solution to this problem. Here, the neighbours maintain a
priority queue of incoming RREQs and reduce the probability
of processing RREQs from a node if a high number of
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Fig. 4. Snapshot of the network after an intruder generates a malicious
RREQ (after one hop)
Fig. 5. Snapshot of the network with malicious RREQ flooding
Fig. 6. Prevention of malicious RREQ flooding [27]
incoming RREQs are received from this node. If the number
of RREQs received from a node exceeds a threshold the node
neighbours cut off the path. For example, in Figure 6 if the
number of RREQs received by the neighbours of node v6
exceeds a threshold, each neighbour ignores v6and cuts off the
path. However, in some applications of MANETs, such as in
networks formed for a seminar, some nodes might reasonably
generate more data, for example if node v2 is the seminar chair.
Yet the method proposed in [27] based on a static threshold
will cut off the path of node v2 as shown in Figure 6. Node
mobility will further degrade the performance of this approach;
for example if intruder v6 after a few broadcasts moves and
continues the attack from another location, it can easily bypass
this protection mechanism.
2) Black Hole Attack Illustration: We now consider the
network in Figure 7 and illustrate how an intruder can launch
a black hole or grey hole attack. We suppose that nodes v9
and v4 each need routes to nodes v13 and v7 respectively.
Therefore, nodes v9 and v4 broadcast RREQs and the initial
flow of RREQs is shown in Figure 8. Now assume node v6 is
an intruder and wants to capture the routes in the network to
cause either a black or grey hole attack, by using false RREP
packets in the following way:
The two RREQs from nodes v9 and v4 will be heard by
node v6, which then checks its current destination sequence
numbers for v13 and v7.
• Intruder v6 prepares RREP packets for these RREQs with
destination sequence numbers higher than the current
destination sequence number for nodes v13 and v7.
• v6 sends these false RREPs back to the source nodes v9
and v4 as shown in Figure 9.
After receiving the false RREPs, source nodes v9 and v4 will
select the route through v6, since the received RREPs suggest
that v6 has the freshest routes. By repeating this process,
intruder v6 can successfully capture other routes in the network
and force most of the network traffic flow through itself. Now
the intruder v6 is in control of the network data traffic and
can drop data packets to cause either black hole or grey hole
attacks. For instance, source nodes v9 and v4 will send data
packets to their destination node which will reach node v6;
instead of forwarding these data packets, v6 can drop them
all, causing a black hole attack as shown in Figure 10.
3) Grey Hole Illustration : Figure 11 shows an example of
a grey hole attack, where intruder v6 decides to drop packets
for v13 and forward all other packets as shown.
4) Rushing Attack Illustration: In a rushing attack the in-
truder exploits the property of an on-demand routing protocol,
according to which nodes are only allowed to forward the first
RREQ that arrives for each route discovery and are required to
discard RREQs later received for the same route. An intruder
will “rush” (i.e. transmit early) the RREQ to suppress any later
legitimate RREQs. We again consider the network in Figure
7 as an example. Suppose that node v9 broadcasts a RREQ
for node v13 and node v12 knows the freshest route to v13.
Now, on hearing the RREQ, intruder v6 rushes the RREQ to
suppress the later legitimate RREQ in the following way.
• Intruder v6 ignores the request forwarding delay (this is
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Fig. 8. Snapshot of the network: after route discovery from node v9 & v4
Fig. 9. Snapshot of the network: intruder sending false RREP to source node
v9 & v4
Fig. 10. Snapshot of the network: intruder v6 drops all data packets to create
a black hole
Fig. 11. Snapshot of the network: intruder v6 drops packets selectively to
create a grey hole
Fig. 12. Snapshot of the network with rushing attack
a randomized delay used by the routing protocol to avoid
collision of broadcast packets).
• Intruder v6 rushes (i.e. transmits without delay) the RREQ
with a higher source sequence number.
This rushed RREQ from intruder v6 arrives first at node v12,
and therefore node v12 will discard the legitimate RREQ from
v9 when it arrives later via v10 and v14, as shown in Figure
12. This will not only suppress the legitimate route discovery
but will also increase the probability that routes that include
the intruder will be discovered rather than other valid routes.
This then allows the intruder to perform its attack on other
routes.
III. POINT DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In Section II we classified and illustrated major network
layer attacks. In this Section, the focus moves to the review
of algorithms and mechanisms that have been proposed in
the literature to protect from these attacks. We categorise all
the intrusion detection mechanisms reviewed in this paper
according to the taxonomy of network layer protection mech-
anisms given in Figure 13. We initially divide the mechanisms
according to the number of attack types they can identify. We
define point detection algorithms as those that can detect a
single category of network layer attacks, and general intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) as those that can detect a range of
attack types. Within the point detection algorithms we classify
them according to the type of attack that they protect: these
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algorithms are reviewed in the remainder of this Section.
Intrusion detection systems will be reviewed in Section IV.
A. Protecting Against Data Packet Dropping
Significant research has been conducted in studying and
protecting against data packet dropping attacks. For example
in [28], the authors propose a protection scheme against a data
packet dropping attack based on the cooperative participation
of nodes. This scheme requires every node in the network
to monitor the behaviour of its neighbours; when it detects
packet dropping it invokes a distributed approach to investigate
the attack. After detecting a node that is dropping packets
the scheme then uses a trust collector function to gather
trust values from the neighbours of the suspicious node. If a
majority of the nodes has a low trust value for the suspicious
node, they then inform all the nodes about the attacker by
raising a global alarm. The authors compare the performance
of this scheme against the watchdog algorithm proposed in
[29] and show an improvement in terms of low false alarm
rates.
Some other approaches based on Neighbour Watch System
(NWS) have been proposed to detect malicious nodes that drop
packets [30][31]. Packet forwarding misbehaviour detection
based on the principle of flow conservation is proposed in [32]
and [33], where nodes continuously monitor their neighbours,
maintain the list of nodes they hear and check the behaviour
of the nodes periodically. Misbehaving nodes are detected
by comparing the estimated percentage of packets dropped
with a pre-established misbehaviour threshold. An adaptive
policy-based version of this algorithm was proposed in [34].
Adaptation is achieved in two ways. First the authors propose
a method for the calculation of a misbehaviour detection
threshold. Second, the adaptability of the protection mecha-
nism is achieved using policies that consider changing network
conditions and the management objectives. In SCAN [35],
the authors proposed a self organized network layer protocol
for secure packet delivery in MANETs. They assume that
nodes can overhear packets received by their neighbour and
have a copy of the neighbour’s routing table. So, when a
neighbour receives a packet it finds the next hop through
its routing table. It considers the packet as dropped if the
monitoring node does not overhear the packet being forwarded
from the neighbouring node. To mitigate the effect of packet
dropping in MANETs, Marti et al. [29] proposed a mechanism
consisting of two parts: watchdog and pathrater. Watchdog
uses promiscuous listing to identify the nodes that drop packets
and pathrater maintains the path of every node and decreases
its rating when it learns its packet dropping behaviour from
watchdog. To mitigate the effect of packet dropping, pathrater
selects the path based on the nodes’ rating.
B. Protecting Against Sleep Deprivation Attacks
We now review protection mechanisms against a SD attack.
Yi et al. [27] considered a route request (RREQ) flooding at-
tack in MANETs. They proposed a RREQ flooding prevention
mechanism based on neighbour’s supervision that maintains
a priority queue of the incoming RREQs. This mechanism
reduces the priority of RREQs generated by a specific node if
a higher rate of incoming queries from that particular node
is observed. However, as we noted in Section II, in some
applications of MANETs there can be specific nodes that
generate more traffic than average; for example, in on-the-
fly networks during a seminar, and yet the method of Yi et
al. will in all cases remove requests above a certain incoming
request rate. In [36] the authors proposed an analytical model
which detects flooding attacks in MANETs using flow based
detection features. In [37] the authors described three ways
by which an attacker can drain the batteries of wireless
devices, such as PDAs and notepads, in a mobile comput-
ing environment, for example through repeated requests for
services or by forcing nodes to do energy hungry tasks. To
analyze the impact of this attack they experimented with an
IBM Thinkpad T23 notepad, a Compaq iPAQ 37600 PDA
and a Compaq Itsy. Their results showed that the average
power consumption of the IBM Thinkpad and Compaq iPAQ
increased by approximately 15% and 30% respectively under
sleep deprivation attack. Then they proposed a power secure
architecture with the aim of defending against these attacks
by guaranteeing a minimum battery life even when the de-
vice is under attack. The architecture employs two features:
energy signature monitoring and multilayer authentication.
The authors of [38] considered a sleep deprivation attack
through injecting packets and proposed a lightweight inter-
layer protocol to detect this in MANETs. Similarly, Yu and
Ray [39] described sleep deprivation attacks that used two
types of traffic injection attack in ad hoc networks, namely
query flooding and data packet injection. They investigated
these two attacks from the attacker’s point of view and theo-
retically analyzed the probability of cases where the attacker
can successfully launch these attacks without being detected.
Then, assuming nodes that can authenticate each other through
a public key mechanism, they proposed a query flooding
attack detection mechanism using neighbour monitoring. On
receiving a route request each node checks conditions, such
as the legality of the source and the destination, request id,
the time the request was received previously, and whether any
node in the route is already marked as a bad node. However,
the authors did not identify the cases where the intruder
bypasses these checks by using the malicious RREQ flooding
1 and 2 mechanisms illustrated in section II.A.
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To guard MANETs against black hole attacks several mech-
anisms have been proposed using different strategies. In [16]
Tseng et al. surveyed existing solutions for detecting black
hole attacks and classified these proposals as identifying either
single (i.e. a single attacker launches the attack in the network)
or cooperative black hole attacks (i.e. two or more nodes
collaborate to launch the attack). TOGBAD [40] is an example
of a black hole detection mechanism. It detects the attack
using a topology graph, looking at the number of neighbours
a node claims to have and the actual number of neighbours
according to the graph. TOGBAD was developed for the
OLSR proactive routing protocol, where topology informa-
tion can be obtained; however it would not be effective for
reactive routing protocols, where acquiring complete topology
information is not operationally feasible. In [41] the authors
proposed a black hole detection method for AODV in which,
on receiving a reply, the receiver node initiates a judgement
process about the replier. Neighbours share their opinion about
the replier. A decision is made based on number (a fixed
threshold) such that if a node receives many packets but does
not send a certain number of packets then it is considered
to be malicious. In our opinion, considering the dynamic
environment of MANETs, such mechanisms based on fixed
thresholds to detect black hole attacks suffer from high false
alarm rates since they have no means to adapt to changes
caused by node mobility. In [42] Zhang et al. proposed a black
hole detection scheme based on sequence number checking
of the RREP packets. They considered a scenario where an
intermediate node is an attacker and suggested that, whenever
a node sends a RREP back to a source node, the intermediate
node should also generate a request for a sequence number to
the destination node. The destination node responds by sending
a packet containing its sequence number to the source node.
The source node then checks the freshness of the route by
comparing the sequence number of the RREP received from
the intermediate node (suspect) with the sequence number
reply packet from the destination node; it consequently detects
an attack if the comparison fails. However, the introduction
of two new packets with every reply not only increases the
routing overhead but also the nodes have to ensure that the
attacker does not drop or modify these sequence request and
sequence reply messages.
D. Protecting Against Grey Hole Attacks
Xiaopeng and Wei [43] proposed a grey hole detection
scheme for the DSR routing protocol. This requires each
node to produce evidence on forwarding packets using an
aggregated signature algorithm. Then a checkup algorithm
detects whether packets have been dropped or not; finally,
a source node uses a diagnostic algorithm to trace the ma-
licious node. They slightly modified their proposal in [44],
using a Distributed Certificate Authority (DCA) to update key
management information, facilitating the detection process that
uses the aggregate signature algorithm. Another mechanism
for grey hole detection in AODV was proposed in [24],
which requires all nodes to maintain their neighbours’ data
forwarding information. After a certain time, each node checks
any neighbour with whom it has not communicated recently,
and initiates the detection procedure for that node. The initiator
performs a local detection by checking the number of RTS
(request to send) and CTS (clear to send) messages; if this
node is found to be suspicious then it asks other neighbours
of the suspected node to check and finally it makes a decision
about the suspected node.
E. Protecting Against Rushing Attacks
In [25], Hu et al. analyzed how an attacker can launch a
rushing attack (RU) in DSR and proposed a rushing attack
prevention mechanism for MANETs. They described ways
an intruder can use it to launch the attacks; for example an
attacker can rush a RREQ by using a higher than normal
radio range using a higher power level or a higher gain
antenna to suppress later legitimate RREQs. They assumed
negligible MAC protocol delays. They proposed a secure
neighbour detection mechanism through a mutual authentica-
tion protocol that uses tight delay timing to ensure that other
node is within the communication range. To integrate their
rushing prevention with the routing protocol they ensure that
before sending or forwarding a RREQ a node first performs
a secure neighbour detection exchange with the previous
hop node. In [46] the authors proposed a Secure Message
Transmission (SMT) protocol that ensures a secure end-to-
end data forwarding protocol. They suggested that SMT can
be used mainly for protecting the data forwarding operation,
while route discovery procedures that are vulnerable to routing
attacks such as rushing attacks can be secured using the Secure
Routing Protocol (SRP) [47], an Internet Draft earlier proposed
by the same authors in an attempt to mitigate the effects of
misbehaving nodes in routing operations. However, they did
not evaluate the effectiveness of SRP against routing attacks.
In [48] Rawat et al. examined the possibility of a rushing attack
on SRP and concluded that SRP can withstand the attacks.
F. Protecting Against Sybil Attacks
The use of trusted certificates through a certificate authority
is by far the most commonly cited solution for sybil attacks.
Douceur claimed [49] that using trusted certificates is the only
way of completely eliminating sybil attacks from MANETs.
Piro et al. showed in [26] that mobility could be used to
identify sybil identities in MANETs. They proposed that a
single node could detect a sybil attack by keeping track
of the identity (i.e. the IP or MAC address) of nodes it
hears transmitting. Groups of nodes that are heard together
could be identified as possible attackers. They also suggested
that multiple trusted nodes could share their observations to
increase the accuracy of detection. In [50] Monica et al.
claimed that radio resource tests of devices would allow the
detection of sybil identities in the network. They assessed
the power and performance of different radio resource tests
including simultaneous sender test, optimized simultaneous
sender test, simultaneous receiver test and forced collision test.
9G. Comparison
We now compare the point detection algorithms described
above. We first analyze them based on parameters such as the
detection technique, addressed attack type, routing protocol
used, response to attack and architecture. Table 1 provides a
summary of the main point detection algorithms, where suffi-
cient details are given in the original paper. The architecture
of most of the proposed algorithms is either distributed or
hierarchical, reflecting the distributed nature of the MANET
itself. A hierarchical approach is used by the authors of
these algorithms to provide some level of scalability, where
information has to be gathered from across the network in
order to detect the specific attack, and where the aim is not
to impose a significant processing overhead on a single node
in the network. The hierarchical architectures organize nodes
in tiers and assign different roles to each tier level. Clustering
techniques are extensively used to organize nodes in MANETs
in a hierarchy. The hierarchical approach generally has a lower
overhead compared to the flat distributed approaches because
nodes communicate with a smaller set of nodes (such as cluster
heads) than in the fully distributed case. We also note from
the “Source of Data” column in Table 1 that monitoring of
transmissions to or from neighbouring nodes is a particularly
popular mechanism for data gathering (this is also known by
some authors as promiscuous monitoring); in this case some
node X is within range of another node Y and overhears the
communications to and from Y even if those communications
do not directly involve X. The principal alternative, direct
reporting, is where data is collected directly from the nodes
themselves. In this case, nodes transmit observed data to other
nodes using special packets. The advantage of monitoring by
neighbours is that it provides an independent source of data for
the algorithms (unless two neighbouring nodes are colluding
in an attack); whereas data reported directly from nodes may
be susceptible to compromise. On the other hand, the nature of
wireless transmissions means that some transmissions may not
be overheard, even for two nodes that are in close proximity,
and algorithms that use neighbour monitoring therefore have
to deal with a degree of uncertainty in the data they are
using. We also note that most of the mechanisms use detection
techniques that are so specific that they require a particular
routing protocol to identify a particular attack. For example,
[27] uses priority queues of incoming RREQs to deal with
malicious RREQ flooding for AODV. Clearly, this reduces the
general applicability of these algorithms. Some of the point
detection algorithms attempt to respond to a detected attack,
usually by isolating the intruding node so that its traffic and
data are removed from the network and the network traffic is
routed around the intruder (see “Response of Attack” column).
In other cases the response to intrusion is not considered by
the authors. A general comment about all the point detection
algorithms in Section III is the observation that since one
algorithm can only detect one class of attack it means that: (a)
a large number of algorithms would need to be implemented
in a MANET to provide a wide range of intrusion coverage;
(b) interactions between different point detection algorithms
would need to be considered in building a robust intrusion
detection environment that can cope with many different attack
types [10]; (c) a wide range of differing algorithms will
impose a significant overhead on the MANET in terms of
network traffic, processing overhead and administration; and
(d) discovery of further classes of attacks will require further
research on specific algorithms. We are not aware of any
research that has been conducted on the interactions between
the various algorithms. In addition, it seems sensible for the
network to have a consistent defined response to intrusion,
and as we have commented above, the attack response is not
considered by all the algorithms. Although it could be argued
that some of the algorithms discussed in this Section have been
optimised to detect their named attacks with high efficiency (or
to identify the attacks quickly, or for the algorithms themselves
to be robust against attacks or collusion between multiple
nodes, etc.), all these points suggest that a more general
intrusion detection system may provide a better solution to
the protection of MANETs.
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
In this Section we consider IDSs that can identify a range
of attacks. We first introduce the concepts and background
knowledge of intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Secondly,
we describe challenges faced by MANET intrusion detection
systems, and finally, we review MANET intrusion detection
system proposals, including intrusion response systems.
A. Intrusion Detection Techniques
Intrusion Detection Systems can be split into three main
classes based on the detection approach employed: (1)
anomaly-based intrusion detection (ABID), also known as
behaviour-based intrusion detection; (2) misuse detection, also
known as knowledge-based intrusion detection (KBID); and
(3) specification-based intrusion detection (SBID), which has
been proposed recently. Figure 13 gives our taxonomy of
network layer protection mechanisms. For the division that
covers mechanisms that can deal with a range of different
attacks (i.e. intrusion detection systems), we classify them
according to the intrusion detection technique they use: either
ABID, KBID, SBID, or a hybrid of these, or some other
mechanism. Before we review the systems that have been
proposed in the literature, we start by reviewing the three main
intrusion detection techniques.
1) Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection : Anomaly-based
intrusion detection (ABID) systems flag as anomalous ob-
served activities that deviate significantly from the normal
profile. ABID systems are also known as behaviour-based
intrusion detection, in which the model of normal behaviour
of the network is extracted, and then this model is compared
with the current behaviour of the network to detect intrusion
in the network. A diagram illustrating the basic ABID process
is shown in Figure 14. Anomaly detection systems typically
consist of two phases of operation: training and testing.
Training is the process of modelling the normal or expected
behaviour of the network or of the users. The model also acts
as a profile of user or network behaviour. For any anomaly-
based IDS to be effective, it must therefore have a consistent
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Fig. 14. Anomaly-based intrusion detection process
and stable profile that characterizes this behaviour. A profile
consists of information about the list of parameters which
are specifically geared to the target being monitored. Con-
structing an effective profile involves gathering information
on behaviour and activity that is considered acceptable for the
network.
Testing for intrusion involves comparing the normal or
expected behaviour model derived during the training phase
with the current model of the network or users. The de-
tection techniques usually involve statistical or mathematical
approaches to flag any significant deviation between two
models. For anomaly detection techniques to be effective,
they must have mechanisms that keep the false alarm rate
low. ABID systems extensively use statistical methods [51]
[52] to estimate the deviation between the expected and
the current behaviour to detect an intrusion in the network.
Statistical probabilistic techniques including the chi-square
test, Hotelling’s T2 test, decision trees and Markov chains are
employed in ABID systems. Neural network algorithms [53]
have also been used to learn and model the behaviour of the
users in the network. The key advantage of ABID systems
is that they can detect attempts to exploit new unforeseen
vulnerabilities, because ABID looks for deviations from the
normal expected behaviour. ABID systems can also provide
early warnings of potential intrusions in the network. However,
they are prone to generate false alarms.
2) Knowledge-Based Intrusion Detection: Knowledge-
based intrusion detection systems maintain a knowledge base
that contains signatures or patterns of well-known attacks and
looks for these patterns in an attempt to detect them. In other
words, KBID systems have knowledge about specific attacks
and look for attempts to use them. A KBID system triggers an
alarm when such an attempt is detected. A diagram illustrating
the basic KBID process is shown in Figure 15. KBID relies on
knowledge about attacks so anything not explicitly recognized
as an attack based on existing knowledge is declared as non-
intrusive or acceptable. However, the case of an event or a
series of events that has degraded the network performance
can be identified as an unknown attack because it does not
match the existing rules of attacks, and the system can update
the knowledge base by adding a new rule. KBID systems use
various methods for constructing and modelling the knowledge
for intrusion detection, some of which are described below.
Some KBID systems use expert systems [54][55] for in-
Fig. 15. Knowledge-based intrusion detection process
trusion detection. An expert system maintains the knowledge
of known attacks in a knowledge base in the form of a set
of rules. Captured audit data from a monitoring network are
translated into facts and then an inference engine uses these
facts and a set of rules in the knowledge base to detect an
intrusion in the network.
State transition modelling can alternatively be used for in-
trusion detection where the attack is represented as a series of
state transitions and defined attack states. The state transition
models that represent attacks are normally maintained in a
knowledge base and the state transition model is applied in real
time to identify an intrusion in the network. Signature analysis
is also used by KBIDs, where the attacks are modelled through
a sequence of events or patterns, which are then compared with
the generated audit trails to indicate intrusion. Some KBIDs
have also applied rule-based approaches [56] to model the
knowledge of known attacks in the form of a set of rules
which is obtained through observation or by considering attack
scenarios. The KBID checks the audit data by applying rules
of known attacks, either using forward or backward chaining
techniques in search of evidence of an attack. The main
advantage of KBID systems is that they generally have very
low false positive rates of detection (especially when compared
to ABID) simply because they trigger alarms only when the
exact match of a known attack signature, pattern, or sequence
of events occurs. They are therefore best suited to scenarios
where the network is highly vulnerable to certain known
attacks. However, KBID systems have some drawbacks: in
particular, they can only detect attacks whose signatures or
patterns are in the knowledge base, and gathering the required
information about attacks and keeping them up to date is a
demanding task.
3) Specification-Based Intrusion Detection : Generally,
specification-based intrusion detection systems (SBIDs) first
explicitly define specifications as a set of constraints. They
then use these specifications to monitor the routing protocol
operations or network layer operations to detect attacks in
the network. The basic process of SBID is shown in Figure
16. The first step extracts the specifications, which define the
correct operation of (for example) the network or the MAC
layer protocol through a set of constraints. The system then
monitors the execution of the protocol with respect to the given
specification, deviations from the specification being treated as
intrusion [57]. Syntax- and semantic-based approaches have
also been proposed for network based intrusion detection
system in fixed networks [58].
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Fig. 16. Specification-based intrusion detection process
B. Challenges of Intrusion Detection Systems in MANETs
Intrusion detection systems developed for fixed networks
are not directly implementable in the wireless network en-
vironment, and therefore research in the last few years has
focused on securing MANETs with IDSs. Intrusion detection
in MANETs is more complex and challenging than in fixed
networks for reasons that we now discuss.
Unlike fixed networks, MANETs lack concentration points
where monitoring and audit data collection can be performed.
For example, in fixed networks, traffic is monitored at net-
work gateways whereas in an infrastructureless MANET a
node can only observe other nodes within its radio range;
attackers outside this radio range can therefore escape easily.
Consequently, the network-based IDS (NIDS) proposals used
in fixed networks are not directly implementable in MANETs.
Realizing this difficulty, researchers have proposed coopera-
tive approaches of audit data collection and the application
of intrusion detection techniques using network clustering
[59][60][61][62].
Moreover, MANETs introduced a new set of routing pro-
tocols, which are significantly different from those used in
fixed networks. These protocols require nodes to cooperate
and act as routers; but it also means that the network’s
routing infrastructure is not under the control of a single
management entity. This has created opportunities for attackers
to identify vulnerabilities and find new ways to launch attacks,
as explained in Section II.
Attacks in MANETs differ from those in fixed networks and
therefore most detection methods used in fixed networks are
not directly applicable; hence alterations to existing techniques
and the introduction of new methods for intrusion detection
have been considered by researchers.
Due to the nodes’ mobility, the topology of the network is
dynamic and unpredictable and this makes the entire process
of intrusion detection complicated. First, it makes it difficult
to capture and gather audit data; then, it is hard to accurately
characterize the normal behaviour of the network; and, finally,
the detection phase has to accommodate the dynamics of
MANETs.
ID in MANETs is more demanding because some of the
MANETs’ characteristics such as the nodes’ limited compu-
tational ability limit the effectiveness of host-based intrusion
detection systems (HIDS), where the IDS is deployed in a
distributed architecture on each host. Additionally, because
the geographical territory of the network is not defined in
MANETs, it is difficult to physically secure a node. The
limited bandwidth of MANETs in contrast to wired networks
additionally makes it challenging to transfer large amount of
intrusion detection data and therefore MANET IDSs have
to limit the volume of data transfer required for intrusion
detection.
To sum up, every phase of intrusion detection in MANETs
presents additional challenges as compared to fixed networks.
C. Proposed IDSs for MANETs
From the discussion of Section IV.B we can see the extra
challenges and complexities that IDSs have to overcome in
MANETs. To overcome these, researchers have, as with the
point detection algorithms, tended to use either distributed
(peer-to-peer) or hierarchical (clustered) architectures for IDS.
Following our taxonomy of Figure 13, we now review
MANET intrusion detection systems that have been proposed
in the literature, classifying them under the headings of ABID,
KBID, SBID, Hybrid IDS or other proposals.
1) Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Proposals:
Anomaly detection approaches appear to hold more promise
than knowledge-based approaches, since they utilize learning
techniques to enable adaptation to the ever-changing MANET
environment. This is important for MANETs where the
overall behaviour of the network changes with time because
of nodes periodically entering or leaving the network. In
addition, anomaly-based detection is simpler in operation
because it needs to first establish a normal expected behaviour
and then compare it with the current behaviour to detect
intrusion, as explained in Section IV.A. Researchers have
proposed anomaly-based detection techniques based on
different training and testing approaches. Some of these
approaches are discussed below.
In [63] Cretu et al. proposed an anomaly detection approach
for MANETs in which they model device behaviour, which
peers can then use to determine the trustworthiness of other
nodes. They examine their approach through an anomalous
payload detector: the training phase observes payloads and
then aggregates them from different nodes to build profiles
which are compared by forming a similarity matrix. However,
exchanging models among all nodes in a MANET could
produce a significant processing and communication overhead,
and devices in the networks can have different behaviour
depending on the application of the MANET. In [64], Liu et al.
proposed a game theoretic framework for intrusion detection
in MANETs. They model the intruder and the defender as
a two player Bayesian game. They propose Bayesian hybrid
detection approaches which monitor the network in two differ-
ent ways, namely in lightweight and heavyweight monitoring
systems. The lightweight monitoring system consumes less
energy and thus it is always on, whereas the heavyweight
monitoring system uses ABID to build a normal profile and
compare it against the tested data in order to detect intrusion.
Markov chain classifiers are also used in anomaly detection.
For example, Jiang and Wang [65] proposed an anomaly
detection algorithm based on Markov chains for wireless
ad hoc networks. The algorithm consists of two parts: the
construction of a Markov chain table and the construction of
a classifier using a Markov model. The audit data traces are
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first converted into sequences of symbols and a Markov chain
table with state transitions is constructed. The second part
consists of constructing a classifier using the Markov chain
model that checks whether the current transition follows the
Markov property by using a uniform distribution to calculate
trace values and set the threshold to detect anomalies. Markov
chain classifiers have also been used in fixed networks by Jha
et al. [66], who used a sequence of system calls corresponding
to each process as the traces of system activity. These traces of
different sets of events were recorded in a Linux environment,
and test suites and classifiers were constructed to detect
anomalies. In [67] Sun et al. modified the Markov chain
classifier for detecting routing disruption attacks of falsified
RREPs in AODV MANETs. Similarly, in [68], the authors
proposed using a Markov chain model and Hotelling’s T2 test
approach to detect local intrusion in MANETs. They argue
that the nodes’ mean speed does not accurately reflect the
MANET’s dynamics, and so it is not an efficient parameter to
adjust the impact of mobility on IDS. They proposed instead
that each local IDS agent periodically use link rate change to
accommodate the effect of mobility.
Statistical probabilistic techniques are extensively used for
anomaly detection. For example, research using probabilistic
techniques for anomaly detection was conducted by Ye et al.
[51]. They conducted a comprehensive investigation of the
frequency and ordering property of audit data by applying
probabilistic techniques including Hotelling’s T2 test, the chi
square multivariate test, a Markov chain approach and decision
trees as a pattern recognition technique for detecting intrusion
into the information system in fixed networks. To test the
performance of these techniques they gathered one sample
of both normal and intrusive activities by monitoring and
collecting computer audit data from a Sun SPARC workstation
running the Solaris operating system, which has a Basic
Security Module (BSM) to record audit events. The second
sample of normal and intrusive activities was taken from
MIT Lab, which was produced by a US Air Force project.
After testing, they concluded that anomaly detection through
a chi square test based on frequency property provides good
intrusion detection performance, and a Markov model based
on the ordering property can provide additional advantages
for detecting intrusion in an information system. After [51],
Ye and Chen proposed an anomaly detection scheme in [52],
based on only the chi-square test for detecting intrusion into
information systems in fixed networks. In this paper, they used
the same sample MIT audit data of normal events that they
used in [51], and split that sample into two groups, one to be
used for training a normal profile and the other to be used for
testing. They considered some intrusion scenarios, built audit
data of intrusive events and applied the chi square test. They
observed a promising performance for intrusion detection in
terms of high detection and low false alarm rate. We consider
that their proposal could be applied with modifications in
MANETs for detecting denial of service attacks. In [22]
we proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection protocol
(AIDP), which uses a combination of the chi square goodness
of fit test and control charts to detect, identify and isolate an
intruder causing a sleep deprivation attack.
Fig. 17. The IDS peer-to-peer architecture for MANETs [69]
Zhang and Lee [69] proposed an intrusion detection system
architecture in which an IDS agent runs on each mobile
node, as shown in Figure 17. The agent collects local data
by gathering real-time audit data from various sources and
performs local detection through an engine: this analyses the
local data traces from the data collection module for anomalies
and uses anomaly detection to detect abnormal updates to the
routing table. A cooperative detection and global response
is then triggered when an intrusion is reported by a node.
In [70], Zhang et al. extended and implemented the IDS
architecture proposed in [69] in a simulation study. Kurosawa
and Jamalipour [23] also proposed a black hole detection
mechanism, this time for AODV, where three feature vectors
are used to model normal states of the network and an ABID
discrimination module is used to identify the black hole attack.
Albers et al. in [71] proposed a Local Intrusion Detection
System architecture (LIDS) which uses a MIB (Management
Information Base) agent, a SNMP (Simple Network Manage-
ment Protocol) agent and a local intrusion detection agent that
work together to detect intrusion.
Sterne et al. in [59] proposed a cooperative IDS architecture
which is organized as a dynamic hierarchy, as shown in Figure
18, where the nodes annotated with 1 and 2 represent first and
second level cluster nodes respectively. In this hierarchical
architecture, data is acquired at leaf nodes through either
promiscuous monitoring or direct reporting. After the data
is acquired, it is then analysed as it flows upwards towards
cluster head nodes. The cluster head applies ABID techniques
in a detection module to detect nodes that intentionally drop
a significant amount of data packets. The authors claimed that
routing attacks such as the modification of RREQ packets can
be detected, but this was not demonstrated in the paper because
the main purpose was to propose an architecture that can meet
the challenges of IDSs.
In [72], Kachirski and Guha proposed distributed intrusion
detection based on mobile agent technology for wireless ad
hoc networks. This IDS uses a mobile agent framework,
where three types of agent (monitoring agent, action agent
and decision making agent) run on network nodes as shown in
Figure 19. They used a distributed algorithm that selects nodes
in the network which will run the monitoring agent to observe
and analyze network packets and the decision making agents
to make decisions on network level intrusion. In addition,
host monitoring and action agents are implemented on all the
nodes in the network for monitoring system and application
level activities on each host and for taking action to respond
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Fig. 18. The IDS dynamic hierarchical architecture for MANETs [59]
Fig. 19. Layered mobile agent architecture for a distributed IDS[72]
to intrusion on a host respectively. The paper focused on
presenting the distributed mobile agent architecture from an
implementation perspective. However, it also considered intru-
sion (attack) scenarios to validate the proposed mechanism’s
effectiveness under various network layer attacks.
Neural network algorithms [73] have also been used for
intrusion detection. In [74] the authors proposed an intrusion
detection engine for MANETs that used a neural network and
watermarking techniques. They use self-organizing maps in
conjunction with machine learning and watermarking tech-
niques [75] to design an intrusion detection engine. The
architecture of the proposed mechanism is shown in Figure
20: it first extracts MAC layer features, then it performs data
collection and intrusion detection using an engine, and finally
it applies the appropriate intrusion response. Each node creates
a map that represents its security status, and distributes it
to neighbouring nodes. Once a node has received all maps
from its neighbours it then generates a global map which
helps the node to estimate how secure the MANET is and
how to perform routing securely and efficiently by avoiding
the paths that include nodes which are comprised or under
attack from the intruders. Watermarking is used to maintain
the integrity and authenticity of these self-organized maps. The
authors claim this method can detect various types of attacks
but did not specify the attack scenarios against which it had
been tested. Similarly, in [76], the authors proposed an ABID
system that used neural networks to detect DoS attacks in
MANETs. In another example, Huang and Lee [60] proposed
Fig. 20. Intrusion detection architecture [74]
a cooperative intrusion detection system for ad hoc networks.
They developed a clustered IDS using a cluster formation
protocol that ensures only each cluster leader performs ID.
They proposed a cluster head assisted anomaly detection cross
feature analysis to detect various attacks.
2) Knowledge-Based Intrusion Detection Proposals:
Knowledge-based approaches have an advantage of very low
false alarm rates as compared to ABID systems because they
maintain a knowledge base containing signatures or patterns of
attacks and only look for these specific attacks. As mentioned
in Section IV.A, KBID systems use different techniques to
model the knowledge about attacks. KBID systems can use
state transition modelling; for example, STAT (“state transition
analysis”) [77] maintains the knowledge attacks in fixed net-
works as a sequence of states. This approach models intrusion
using a state transition diagram as a series of state changes
from an initial secure state to a final compromised state. In
[78], the authors used the concepts of STAT [77] to design
an intrusion detection tool, AODVSTAT, to detect packet
dropping and spoofing attacks in MANETs. Signatures are
represented by using an event model and the events are either
data or AODV routing packet exchanges in the network. They
assume that each node is equipped with an AODVSTAT sensor.
This sensor performs a state analysis of the packet stream that
the node has observed either by monitoring its neighbour or
through updates from its neighbour’s observations to detect
signs of attacks. In [79] the authors focused on services to
propose a detection framework for MANETs that identifies
nodes that are not authorized for specific services.
A study to analyse the effectiveness in ad hoc networks
of KBID using signature detection of known attacks was
conducted in [80]. The authors assumed they knew the at-
tack signature and that the node could execute an intrusion
detection process to detect an attack on the ad hoc routing
protocol. They considered a very simple scenario with an
intruder node as part of the initial path between source and
destination, and estimated the probability of detecting this
intruder with and without node mobility. They concluded that
a MANET using a reactive routing protocol is less effective
at detecting an attack than one with proactive routing. In [81]
the authors proposed a peer-to-peer KBID IDS architecture,
a distributed intrusion detection architecture based on a static
database. The architecture has two parts. First, an IDS mobile
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agent resides on each node in the network, and is responsible
for detecting local intrusions based on local audit data and
participating in cooperative algorithms with other IDS agents
to make decisions about potential intrusions. The second part is
a secure stationary database that contains known misuse attack
signatures. However, the assumption made in this paper is that
the stationary database is accessible to all the nodes, which in
a decentralized MANET architecture is difficult to achieve.
3) Specification-Based Intrusion Detection Proposals: The
SBID approach was introduced and tested in fixed networks
in [57] [82] [83]. In MANETs, SBIDs describe the correct
operation of the protocol by defining a set of constraints,
and monitor the execution of the protocol with respect to the
defined constraints to detect anomalies in the network. For
example, in [45] the authors proposed a SBID system for the
AODV routing protocol. They use a finite state machine to
define the correct operation of AODV in terms of the RREQ-
RREP flow, including a suspicious state. Monitoring nodes
are selected to monitor the RREQ-RREP flow according to
the defined specification. They indicate an anomaly if the
suspicious state is reached. Tseng et al. [86] proposed a
SBID approach for the optimized link state routing (OLSR)
protocol. They proposed a finite state automata model that
defines a correct operation of the OLSR node by defining a
set of constraints, for example how the OLSR node handles
control traffic. Then nodes (using a distributed architecture)
monitor a neighbour’s behaviour according to the defined
specifications. The nodes detect intrusion by comparing the
neighbour’s behaviour with defined specifications. Similarly,
in [84] an extended finite state machine (EFSM) was used in a
SBID system for OLSR-based networks. The authors manually
derived the set of constraints from the IETF’s specification
for OLSR [85] in the form of message sent and received
traces. The EFSM compares a network’s traces with the
specification, using backward tracking to identify intrusion. In
[87], the authors proposed a specification synthesis to model
and analyze MANET routing protocols. They focused on the
flow of traffic to extract specifications in the form of directed
graphs where nodes represent the protocol configuration and
edges show how the protocol evolves from one configuration
to another. They use this specification to detect run time
anomalous behaviour, and have constructed and validated
specifications for DSR and AODV through a simulation-based
case study.
4) Hybrid Intrusion Detection Proposals: In some propos-
als the authors have used a combination of ABID and KBID
techniques; we refer to these as hybrid approaches. In [88],
CRADS, a cross layer approach, was proposed that uses a
non linear detector based on a support vector machine (SVM)
[89] to detect packet dropping, spoofing, modification and
rushing attacks on the proactive routing protocol OLSR. As
shown in Figure 21, CRADS consists of three modules: a)
data collection, which collects data from the network, MAC
and physical layers, b) data reduction, which reduces the
number of features and events in the training data set, and c)
a learning module, which uses the SVM classification model
to differentiate between benign and malicious events.
In an extension of the original ABID system, AIDP [22],
Fig. 21. CRADS architecture [88]
Fig. 22. GIDP architecture [90]
a generalized intrusion detection and prevention mechanism
(GIDP) was proposed in [90]. GIDP uses a combination
of both anomaly- and knowledge-based intrusion detection
techniques to protect a MANET from a wide variety of
network layer attacks including simultaneous multiple attacks.
Figure 22 shows the architecture of GIDP, which consists of
three phases: 1) data collection, 2) training and 3) testing.
In the first phase, the network layer characteristics and a
performance matrix are collected from the network nodes, and
in the second phase the training module uses this information
to build training profiles. Finally, the testing module is invoked
periodically to detect intrusion, identify any attack(s) and
identify intruding nodes, and respond to a detected intrusion.
The ABID module detects an intrusion, and the KBID module
helps the system to identify the specific attack from its set of
rules.
5) Other Intrusion Detection Proposals: In the literature
there are examples of intrusion detection mechanisms that can
detect a range of attack types but where the authors have not
explicitly mentioned the type of ID techniques they used. In
[91], Hijazi and Nasser studied and analysed the feasibility of
mobile agents for MANET intrusion detection and concluded
that many mobile agents’ features satisfy the requirements for
MANET IDS. They believe that mobile agents (autonomous
executing programs) that execute without being affected by the
originating node status have direct relevance to the challenges
faced in MANETs, such as reducing network load, conserving
bandwidth, and having robust and fault-tolerant behaviour.
However, they also point out that mobile agents have inherited
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security vulnerabilities, which is one of the reasons why they
are still not used extensively for ID.
In [62] Yi et al. presented a clustered detection approach
where periodically a single node is elected as the monitoring
node; it then monitors the cluster and performs both local
and global detection. They abstracted the correct behaviour
of the nodes based on the DSR routing protocol specification
and constructed a finite state machine (FSM). The monitor
node checks every node’s behaviour and indicates an attack
if a certain node behaviour is not verified through the FSM.
Some other researchers have proposed approaches that are
more general than the point detection algorithms of Section
III but which are not based on ABID, KBID or SBID. For
example, ARAN [93] is a hop-by-hop authenticated routing
mechanism that can protect MANETs against a number of
attacks from external malicious nodes. The authors first define
vulnerabilities in terms of the modification and fabrication
of routing packets in the AODV and DSR routing protocols,
and spoofing. They note that modifying or fabricating certain
routing packets can cause denial of service, route redirection,
tunnelling and routing loops. ARAN detects these attacks by
introducing authentication, integrity and non-repudiation in a
MANET by using a certification process. A similar approach,
Ariadne [94], has been proposed for end-to-end authentication
based on shared key pairs. Karyotis et al. [95] performed a
vulnerability analysis of wireless ad hoc networks through
a probabilistic model. They evaluated various strategies used
by attackers to launch different attacks and used simulations
to analyze the impact of an attack. In another example,
SEAD was proposed in [96] as a secure routing protocol that
uses a one-way hash function to provide authentication for
the proactive routing protocol DSDV against attacks caused
by modification of routing packets, advertising false routing
packets, reply attacks and wormhole attacks.
6) Comparison : Table 2 provides a summary of some
of the MANET IDS mechanisms surveyed in this section,
where sufficient information is available in the original papers,
using the same parameters as Table 1. We can see from
Table 2 that the IDS mechanisms generally use either ABID,
KBID or SBID techniques to identify intrusions, but hybrid
techniques, for example GIDP [90] and CRADS [88], have
been developed in some cases to deal with network layer
attacks. In addition, we observe that there are mechanisms
that deal with multiple attacks by implementing cryptographic
techniques, such as ARAN and SEAD. We furthermore notice
(“Intrusion Response” column) that most of the proposals
do not consider the response to an attack. Yet, interestingly
enough, we have shown in [97] that the careful selection of
the intrusion response can optimise the network’s operation:
for example, for a minor intrusion, the impact of isolating the
intruder may be worse than the impact of the intrusion itself.
As with the point detection algorithms of Section III and
Table 1, the IDSs of Table 2 generally use either distributed
or hierarchical architectures, and for the same reasons. The
“Source of Data” column shows that in Table 2 a wider
range of data sources is typically used compared to the point
detection algorithms. Given the greater level of complexity of
the analysis performed by the IDSs this is not surprising.
The “Routing Protocol” column in Table 2 shows that
more IDS algorithms claim to have general applicability,
independent of the MANET’s routing protocol, as compared
to the protocol-specific point detection algorithms in Table 1.
For example [90][22][59][60][93] are general IDS mechanisms
that happen to have been tested using AODV. Finally, we
observe that ABID is the most popular technique for IDSs,
presumably because of its general applicability and its ability
to identify new unforeseen attacks. But, one drawback of
ABID is its training phase: one needs to have confidence that
there are no attacks taking place during the training period. We
might however expect standard profiles to become available
once MANETs become commonplace and the technology
matures.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The distributed nature of MANETs means that it is vital to
protect them from modern sophisticated network layer attacks.
In this paper we have presented a survey of significant network
layer attacks, and we have reviewed intrusion detection mech-
anisms that have been proposed in the literature. We find that
the protection mechanisms can be classified as either point
detection algorithms or as IDSs that can deal with a wide
range of attacks. In comparing the main proposals in Tables
1 and 2 we have highlighted a number of key similarities and
differences between the various mechanisms.
However, history shows that intruders often find new ways
to attack and cause damage to computer systems and networks.
Therefore, we consider that enabling a protection mechanism
to learn from experience and use the existing knowledge of
attacks to infer and detect new intrusive activities (attacks) is
an important and potentially fruitful area of future research.
We also believe that the development and deployment of
network security policies are vital in networks with a dynamic
environment such as are found in MANETs; this is a further
potential area of research. Finally, the attacker may try to
attack an existing protection scheme; therefore the protection
mechanisms need to be robust enough to protect themselves
and not introduce new vulnerabilities into the system.
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Author Algorithm
Name
Architecture Attack
Type
Addressed
Detection
technique
Response to
Attack
Routing
Protocol
Source of Data Contribution
Sen et al.
[28]
None Distributed Data packet
dropping
Trust-based
approach
Isolate
attackers
Not
specified
Promiscuous
monitoring
Claims to show
improvement over
algorithm in [29]
Yang et
al.[35]
SCAN Distributed Data packet
dropping
Information
cross validation
Isolate
attackers
AODV Collaborative
monitoring
Provides secure packet
delivery in MANETs
Gonzalez
et al. [32]
[33]
None Hierarchical Data packet
dropping
Principle of
flow
conservation
Isolate
attackers
AODV Promiscuous
monitoring
Application of flow
conservation
Marti et
al. [29]
None Distributed Data packet
dropping
Watchdog and
Pathrater
Isolate
attackers
DSR Promiscuous
listing
Detects packet dropping
behaviour using
watchdog & pathrater
Yi et al.
[27]
None Distributed Sleep
deprivation
by
malicious
RREQ
flooding
Priority queue
incoming
RREQs
Isolate
attackers
AODV Promiscuous
monitoring
Malicious RREQ flooding
prevention mechanism
Yu & Ray
[39]
None Distributed Sleep
deprivation
Neighbours
checks certain
conditions
Not
Considered
DSR Neighbouring
nodes’ RREQs
packets
Mechanism to protect
against sleep deprivation
through traffic injection
Hsu et al.
[38]
LIP Not specified Sleep
deprivation
Local broadcast
authentication
Not
considered
Not
specified
Node’s
information
Lightweight interlayer
protocol to prevent packet
injection
Martin et
al. [37]
None Not Specified Sleep
deprivation
Multi level
authentication
& power
signature
Not
considered
Not
considered
Service requests
on SSH server
through ipaq
Analyzes impact of SD
attack on real system &
proposes power secure
architecture
Padillia et
al.[40]
TOGBAD Hierarchical
centralized
Black hole Comparing
claimed number
of neighbours
with topology
graph
Not
considered
OLSR Topology graph Black hole detection for
OLSR
Zhang et
al. [42]
None Distributed Black hole Checking RREP
sequence
numbers
Not
specified
AODV,
SAODV
Sequence no of
RREPs from
intermediate
nodes
Black hole detection
mechanism
Medadian
et al. [41]
None Distributed Black hole Finding safe
route
Not
considered
AODV Neighbours
supervision
Combats BH through
neighbour supervision
Xiaopeng
& Wei
[43]
None Distributed Grey hole Creating proof
& check up
algorithm
Not
specified
DSR Evidence from
forwarded
packets
Grey hole detection
scheme for DSR
Sen et al.
[24]
None Hierarchical Grey hole Monitoring
behaviour in
terms of RREP
Isolate
attackers
AODV Neighbour data
collection
module
Grey hole detection for
AODV
Hu et al.
[25]
None Distributed Rushing
attack
Mutual
authentication
protocol
Not
specified
DSR Transmitted
RREQ packets
radio range
Rushing attack prevention
mechanism for MANETs
Douceur
[49]
None Centralized Sybil Using trusted
certificate
Not
considered
Not
specified
Certificate
managed by CA
Showed that without a
logically centralized
authority it is difficult to
eliminate sybil identities.
Piro et al.
[26]
PASID Distributed Sybil Recording
identities &
mobility pattern
Not
considered
AODV Promiscuous
monitoring
Showed that mobility can
be used to identify sybil
identities in MANETs.
17
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF IDS MECHANISMS
Author Algorithm
Name
Architecture Attack Type
Addressed
Intrusion
Detection
Technique
Intrusion
Response
Routing
Protocol
Source of Data Contribution
Zhang &
Lee [69]
None Distributed
peer-to-peer
Various network
layer attacks
ABID Not considered AODV,
DSR
System events Agent-based IDS
architecture
Albers et
al. [71]
LIDS Hierarchical
clustered
Not specified ABID Isolate attackers Not
specified
SNMP data in
MIB
Local IDS architecture
based on mobile agent
Sterne et
al. [59]
None Hierarchical,
Clustered
Data packet
dropping
ABID Not considered General, but
tested on
AODV
Nodes reporting
to clusters
directly
Dynamic IDS
hierarchical model for
MANETs
Kachirski
& Guha
[72]
None Distributed Not specified ABID Not considered Not
specified
Mobile agent
monitoring
events
Distributed mobile
agent architecture
Nadeem
&
Howarth
[22]
AIDP Hierarchical,
clustered
DoS attacks ABID Isolate attackers General, but
tested on
AODV
Routing
information
ABID for detecting
DoS attacks in
MANETs
Kurosawa
et al. [23]
None Distributed DoS, Black hole ABID Not considered AODV Feature vector Anomaly-based
detection using
feature vector
Cretu et
al. [63]
None Distributed
peer-to-peer
Anomalous
behaviour of
devices
ABID Does not
cooperate with
attackers
Not
Specified
Experimental
testbed
Anomaly detection
model exchange for
MANETs
Huang &
Lee [60]
None Hierarchical,
clustered
Multiple Attacks ABID Not specified General, but
tested on
AODV
Features Clustered IDS that
can detect various
attacks in MANETs
Liu et al.
[64]
None Distributed DoS ABID
(Bayesian
game
theoretic)
Not considered Not
specified
Data from two
type of
monitoring
systems
Model intrusion using
Bayesian game
theoretic framework
Sun et al.
[67]
None Distributed Routing
disruption
attacks
ABID
(Markov
chain
classifier)
Not considered AODV Audit data
sources
Markov chain
anomaly detection
algorithm
Mitrokosta
et al. [74]
None Distributed
collaborative
Various attacks ABID
(Neural
Network)
Avoiding routes
that include
attackers
Not
Specified
MAC layer
features
IDS engine based on
neural network &
watermarking
Jabbehdari
et al. [76]
None Not specified DoS attacks ABID
(Neural
Network)
Not considered Not
Specified
Neural network
elements maping
Uses neural network
for MANET ABID
Smith
[81]
None Distributed Not specified KBID Not considered General Audit data trails KBID using mobile
agents
Vgina et
al. [78]
AODVSTAT Distributed
collaborative
Packet dropping,
resource
depletion
KBID Not considered AODV Data & AODV
routing packets
ID tool for packet
dropping attack using
STAT [77]
Nadeem
&
Howarth
[90]
GIDP Hierarchical,
clustered
Various network
layer attacks
Hybrid ID Isolate attackers General, but
tested using
AODV
Network
characteristics &
performance
matrix
Generalized IDP
mechanism with
attacker isolation
Joseph et
al. [88]
CRADS Not specified Packet drop,
spoofing, rushing
Hybrid ID Not considered OLSR MAC, Network
Physical layer
statistic
Cross layer approach
using non linear
detector
Tseng et
al. [86]
None Distributed DoS attacks SBID (FSM) Not considered OLSR Specifications of
OLSR
SBID for OLSR
Orset et
al.[84]
None Distributed Fabrication,
modification &
Sybil
SBID
(extended
FSM)
Not considered OLSR OLSR IETF
specifications
[85]
SBID with extended
FSM for OLSR
Tseng et
al. [45]
Distributed Not specified SBID Not considered AODV RREQ-RREP
flow
Specifications
FSM that defines
specifications for
AODV operations
Stakhanova
et al.[87]
None Not specified Claim to deal
with various
behaviour
SBID Not considered AODV,
DSR
Specification of
network traffic
flow
SBID mechanism for
AODV and DSR
Hu et
al.[96]
SEAD Distributed Multiple attacks Other IDS Not considered General but
tested on
DSDV
Routing
information
A secure routing
protocol for DSDV
Sanzgiri
et al.[93]
ARAN Centralized Multiple attacks Other IDS Not considered General but
tested on
DSR
AODV
Routing
information
Certification process
provides
authentication,
integrity & non
repudiation
Yi et al.
[62]
None Hierarchical,
clustered
DoS attacks,
routing loop
Other IDS Send alarm DSR DSR routing
specifications
FSM to detect attacks
in DSR without
signature
Hijazi &
Nasser
[91]
None Distributed Not Specified Mobile agent
feasibility for
ID
Not considered Not
Specified
Not Specified Analyzes feasibility of
using mobile agent
for ID in MANETs
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